Highway Grade Crossing - Emergency Notification System (ENS)
Recently, the ILETSB’s counterpart in Wisconsin sent out Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) Emergency Notification System (ENS) flyers to all law enforcement agencies throughout the state of Wisconsin. These flyers explain the use of the blue placards at every train crossing throughout the United States and Canada.
I. New wellness center: Stress/substance abuse therapy for cops only
An innovative medical treatment facility, exclusively for LEOs burdened by substance abuse, stress overload, marital problems, or other wellness-threatening issues, is scheduled to open within the next few months, not far from the Force Science Training headquarters in a Chicago suburb.
Dubbed St. Michael’s House, after the archangel patron of warriors, the special, nondenominational facility will occupy the entire floor of a private medical center and offer both residential and out-patient services for officers and their families.
By Shane W. Fitzpatrick, ACP - Tactical, Tactical Emergency Medical Support, Emergency Medical Services, Calgary Metro Alberta Health Services, IPSA TEMS Committee Chair
The illegal use of fentanyl is quickly becoming a public health crisis in Northern America – specifically Canada and United States. As a paramedic working the front lines on Calgary streets, I am seeing more and more fentanyl overdoses leading to respiratory and cardiac arrest.
This drug is not only affecting the drug users but poses an exposure risk to first responders. Public safety workers need to be educated and protected by protocols and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE).
In most professions, there is some level of stress. However, the demands placed upon police officers and ongoing threats of—and exposure to—violence leads to extremely high levels of stress on a daily basis. Such stress can do more than affect an officer’s job performance; it can also seep into and damage their personal life.
Officers must acknowledge their stress and recognize how it impacts their personal relationships, specifically their marriage. It isn’t until officers accept that stress is taking a toll on their lives that they can then take steps to mediate and reduce the adverse effects it has on them and their families.
An internal FBI investigation into the spike of attacks on law enforcement has determined that revenge, inspired by the Black Lives Matter movement, the media's assault on police shootings, and criticism from politicians, is the what motivates a "majority" of those targeting cops.
"Law enforcement officials believe that defiance and hostility displayed by assailants toward law enforcement appears to be the new norm," said the internal report stamped "For Official Use Only."
The Warrior's Pathwith Duane WolfeAmmo is cheap, lives are expensive - maintain your level of proficiency by regular practiceNov 9, 2016What you do consistently will become your habit. The range is a long way from a gunfight, and all too often officers adopt range behaviors that can lead to serious injury or worse. Here are 10 quick tips to improve your abilities in a gunfight and correct a few bad behaviors I have seen in my time on the range.1.Snap your snapsIn order to draw or reload faster, some officers will release one or more of their retention devices to speed up their draw. The Force Science Institute has determined that if you undo a snap it slows you down because you are programmed to follow a certain sequence. When you change that sequence your brain gets confused and works slower. Train the way you fight because you will fight the way you train. If you train with one device deactivated when the fight comes and that device is in place you will be fighting with the holster, rather than with the suspect(s).2.Don't worry about the scoreAll too often shooters are so concerned about putting one bullet on top of the other that they never push themselves to shoot fast enough for a gunfight. A score is nice as a gauge of progress to meet a qualification standard, but qualification and a gunfight are two different worlds.READ ARTICLE
A good video explaining the realities involved. by Bob Owens and posted on BearingArms.comhttps://youtu.be/FYSsCaUFexw YouTuber "possumpopper89" has crafted a 6-minute video that does a fairly good job of explaining why law enforcement officers (and some "regular Joe" citizens with defensive firearms training) sometimes shoot unarmed people.People who lack this kind of training (which is probably close to 95% of the general population) hold the mistaken belief that officers wait until they see and identify a weapon in a suspect's hand before deciding to open fire.That is simply not the case much of the time. In many instances, it isn't possible to visually identify a weapon due to lighting conditions or attempts by dangerous criminals to conceal a weapon even as they bring them into play.The simply fact of the matter is that you can never react as fast as the other person acts. It requires you to observe the other person's actions, orient (analyze and synthesize the incoming data through the lens past experiences, training, culture, and genetic filters), decide on a response, and then act to carry out that decision.This observe-orient-decide-act process then feeds into the next, as you re-observe, re-orient, make a new decision, and the proceed to your next action. It's a constant series of actions that occurs during your waking hours, first described by U.S. Air Force Col. John Boyd, and it's universally known as the OODA loop.It's that second O, "orient" that explains
New Report:Bringing Calm To Chaos: A Police Foundation review of the San Bernardino terrorist attacks Yesterday (9-9-16), the Police Foundation and the Department of Justice's Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) released a critical incident review of thepublic safety response to the December 2015 terrorist attackin San Bernardino, California.This e-mail provides you with access to the report and an online, interactive version of the report.The report, the latest to be added to the Police Foundation's Critical Incident Review Series and Library,provides aview of the response from the perspective of the first responders and identifies lessons learned before, during, and after the terrorist attack.The lessons learned identifiedcenter on leadership; command and control; planning and response; investigations; community engagement, relationships, and public information; and responder and victim welfare and mental health.San Bernardino area public safety organizations responded to the December 2 terrorist attacks with the utmost bravery and professionalism. Their actions that day saved lives. Many of the decisions made by organizational leaders and steps taken by responders to prepare for, respond to, and recover from the incident can set an example for other organizations as they plan to protect their communities against a similar type of attack.We are thankful to the San Bernardino area public safety leaders, responders, and professionals;federal, state, a
Chief Harry P. Dolan (Ret.)July, 2016Boxing champion Muhammad Ali recently passed away and as I was growing up I admired him as a boxer. Besides being a talented athlete, Ali was a master at using psychology against his opponents. One of his most successful psychological tricks was what he called the "rope-a-dope." The rope-a-dope technique was primarily focused on getting his opponent to "lose his cool."Ali would allow his opponent to get in close and pummel him for a while. Ali would use his arms to protect his face and torso, and lean back against the ropes, using the elasticity in the ropes to help absorb the impacts of his opponent's blows. While his opponent would swing at him, Ali would verbally taunt his opponent as he ducked, weaved, and absorbed some blows. The verbal taunts and insults would enrage his opponent-who would swing harder and faster, over and over again. Before long his opponent would become exhausted from the exertion of all of the swings, and would no longer be thinking clearly because of his anger over the verbal insults. It was at this point that Ali would strike, coming off the ropes full of energy and with a clear mind to fight his opponent. This strategy won him many fights. He called it the rope-a-dope because he was able to rope in his opponent and get him to act like a dope. Ali's goal, as he would later describe, was not to put fear in his opponent but to film them with anger.Far too often today, I believe, police officers are being rope-a-do
DATE: October 21, 2016TIME: 9:00 AM-11:00 AM (2 hour class)LOCATION: Stewart Center West, 2900 W. Pearl City Road, Freeport, ILINSTRUCTOR: Richard FairburnCOURSE content_ Richard Fairburn began analyzing police ambush attacks in 1997, when a sharp increase was noted and the frequency and level of violence has increased steadily ever since. A parallel increase in the use of center-fire rifles in police killings also began in the late 1990's. An average about 17 percent of officers are killed with rifles but that number doubles to 38 percent in Ambush attacks and an even higher 44 percent in the premeditated category of ambush. These trends have continued to grow, reaching their zenith recently in Dallas, Texas and Baton Rouge, Louisiana.This two-hour Ambush Recognition/Survival/Response seminar is a segment pulled from Dick's day-long "Led by a Lion" leadership seminar. For the last three years, this two-hour version has been presented at the annual International Law Enforcement Educators and Trainers Association (ILEETA) conference to overflow crowds.The seminar covers the numbers and nature of the threat, recommended tactics for avoidance as well as survival. The response to the "Officer Down" call which results from an ambush must be controlled by a strong leader to prevent an attacker from successfully using the first victim officer as "bait." The numbers of officers taken down in Dallas and Baton Rouge point out the power of a single determined attacker armed with a rifle
A new page has been added to the MTU1 website and it is found under the "members" tab. The page introduces the "Tactical Emergency Casualty Care (TECC) Guidelines For First Care Providers"These guidelines identify the priorities that have been identified by researchers and those having experienced critical incidents.The Guidelines where produced by the Committee for Tactical Emergency Casualty Care who used the military battlefield guidelines of Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) as an evidenced based starting point in the development of civilian specific medical guidelines for high threat operations. Each phase and medical recommendation of the military TCCC guidelines was examined and discussed by the Committee, and then was re-written, annotated, or removed through consensus voting of the Guidelines Committee to create civilian specific, civilian appropriate guidance. Additionally, the Committee added and/or put specific emphasis on several medical recommendations not included in TCCC to address high threat operational aspects unique to civilian operations.The information on the MTU1 page is meant to introduce and familiarize law enforcement officers about tactical care while under fire, tactical field care or evacuation care. This is in no way meant to replace formal training on the topic.Knowing these guidelines while cooperatively training for a "Rapid Deployment Rescue Task Force", will also help law enforcement officers understand the priorities of fire/EMS personne
Domestic-related incidents represented the highest number of fatal calls for serviceAugust 1, 2016Washington, DC-The National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund has issued a new research report entitled Deadly Calls and Fatal Encounters, a five-year study (2010-2014) analyzing 684 line-of-duty deaths to identify key indicators and early trends that can impact law enforcement officer safety. The purpose of this report is to identify situations that place officers at higher levels of risk and offer multiple recommendations to enhance officer safety. This project was supported by a cooperative agreement awarded by the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS).The analysis focused on cases that involved a dispatched call for service which required a police response and what information was made available to the responding officers. Researchers also examined cases involving self-initiated actions, and what, if any, commonalities were discovered that could be utilized as learning tools to prevent future deadly calls or fatal encounters.http://www.nleomf.org/programs/cops/cops-report.htmlNote that this link also has some fact sheets like "Line of Duty Deaths by Call Type" and "Officers Killed while Alone. I did not attach those docs.Below is a summary of the highlights but we still recommend you read the report.The analysis focused on cases that involved a dispatched call for service which required a police response and what information wa